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Abstract
In average, statutory tax rates in OECD countries fell over 34,84%
between 1982 and 2005. While the seminal papers on tax competition
explain this fall in corporate tax rates by greater capital mobility, we
build on the New Economic Geography literature to investigate em-
pirically the impact of trade integration on tax competition. We use
the disaggregated Trade and Production Database of the CEPII to
build an index of trade phi-ness following the method of Head and
Mayer (2004a). Firstly, we show that trade integration matters for the
tax policy through two channels: (i) on the one hand trade integra-
tion reinforces tax interactions and accelerates the race to the bottom
in corporate taxe rates, but (ii) on the other hand trade integration
makes it possible for countries to set higher corporate tax rates as it
improves their market access. We show that the second e¤ect becomes
insignicant when we control for the rst one. This indicates that the
overall impact of trade integration on corporate tax rates is negative
and could explain the negative relationship between trade integration
and corporate tax rates that we observed in OECD countries between
1983 and 1999. Secondly, we show that countries do not have the same
ability to limit their dependence on other countriesscal policy. More
precisely, the ability of a country to set a high corporate tax rate in-
creases with its market size and its market access, but decreases with
the degree of its government involvement in the wage-setting.
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for their hospitality.
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the decline in corporate tax rates in developed coun-
tries was almost continuous. This trend has contributed to the fear of
tax competition, a process according to which governments compete with
each other to attract capital inows by decreasing their corporate tax rates.
Among the main global regions, it is in the EU that the KPMG institute
recorded the largest decline in the statutory corporate tax rate over the last
fourteen years (see appendix A.1.)1. Behind this common trend, there are
still important scal disparities. In 2006, the highest corporate tax rates
was observed in the G7 countries whose average tax rate (36.5%) was ten
points higher than the average rate of the EU-27 (25.9%). Fiscal disparities
are also important within the EU. In 2006, the corporate tax rate of the
EU-15 (29.54%) was in average ten points higher then the average tax rate
of the new entrants (19.33%). These observations raise two questions we
would like to answer to in this paper.
Did greater economic integration contribute to this common trend of fall
in corporate taxation? From a theoretical point of view, the answer to this
question in not obvious. According to the seminal models of tax competition
(Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1989, Wilson, 1991, Bucovetsky, 1991), capital
mobility lead governments to strategically decrease their capital tax in order
to prevent their country from capital outows. This could explain the recent
fall in corporate tax rates, and its greater intensity in more integrated areas
such as the EU. Nevertheless, recent theoretical papers using a New Eco-
nomic Geography (NEG) framework lead to di¤erent conclusions (Ludema
and Wooton, 2000, Anderson and Forslid, 2003, Baldwin and Krugman,
2004, Ottaviano and Van Ypersele, 2005). They show the sensitivity of
capital ows to the scal policies is tightly related with the level of trade
integration. Hence, this is not capital mobility per se that inuences tax
interactions but rather the trade integration process. Interestingly, the fall
in barriers to trade could have a positive or negative impact on corporate
tax rates2. Moreover, while existing empirical studies focus on the impact
1The main global regions we consider are: 19 countries in the ASPAC region, the
EU, the OECD, 19 countries in the ASPAC region, and 19 countries in the Latin Ameri-
can/Caribbean region.
2A well known result of the NEG literature on tax competition is the non-monotonous
relationship between corporate taxes and the level of trade costs. Ludema and Wooton
(2000), Anderson and Forslid (2003) show that there is a U-shaped relationship between
corporate taxes and trade integration. By contrast, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and
Kind et al. (2000) show that when all the mobile tax base is located in a country, there
is a hump-shaped relationship between the corporate tax of this country and the level of
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of greater economic integration on taxation, they deserved few attention on
the explanation of persistent scal disparities between countries. Which are
the characteristics that allow some countries to sustain higher corporate tax
rates without eroding their attractiveness? While the standard literature on
tax competition fails to explain why bigger countries can set higher corpo-
rate tax rate without eroding their attractiveness, models of tax competition
within a NEG framework explain this by the existence of an agglomeration
rent in the biggest countries. Fiscal disparities might also be related to
the di¤erences in labor market imperfections between countries. Indeed, the
literature on tax competition showed the negative e¤ect of labor market
rigidities on corporate tax rates, which could explain why some countries
are constrained to set lower corporate rates than others.
To answer these questions, we will estimate reaction functions over corpo-
rate tax rates of OECD countries between 1983 and 1999. Our contribution
is twofold. First, we use the disaggregated Trade and Production Database
of the CEPII to build an index of trade integration based on the literature
on border e¤ects and we use it to estimate the sensitivity of tax interactions
to the level of trade integration between countries. Secondly, we evaluate the
impact of agglomeration economies and labor market rigidities on corporate
tax rates.
There are two strands of the literature that contribute to the empirical
evidence on tax competition. Indeed, to test whether the decline in corpo-
rate taxation is caused by the strategic behavior of governments or not, we
need to nd evidence on : (i) the sensitivity of rms location choices to
the scal policy, and (ii) scal interactions between governments. The rst
strand of the literature is aimed at estimating the tax base elasticity to the
tax rate. By comparing the results of 25 empirical studies on the sensitivity
of foreign direct investment to corporate taxation, De Mooij and Ederveen
(2003) estimate the median value of the tax base elasticity to be -3.3. Since
these results show that high corporate tax rates deter investments, we can
expect governments to engage in a race to the bottom in corporate taxa-
tion. The second strand of the empirical literature estimates these strategic
interactions among governments. More precisely, they estimate a reaction
function over corporate tax rates whose slope gives the strength of tax in-
teractions. There is a small but growing empirical literature that estimates
these scal interactions between countries3. Devereux et al. (2007a) show
trade costs.
3The estimation of reaction functions was rst applied to interactions between local
governments (Brett and Pinkse (2000), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Buettner (2001),
Hayashi et Boadway (2001), Revelli (2001a, 2001b), Charlot et Paty (2007)).
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that between 1982 and 1999, governments of 21 OECD countries have com-
peted over the statutory tax rate to attract prots and over the e¤ective
marginal tax rate to attract capital. Cassette and Paty (2007) and Redoano
(2007) nd evidence of tax interactions between EU countries. Both stud-
ies show that tax competition occurs in Europe mainly with respect to big
leader countries. Hence, countries of the EU-15 seem to be more protected
from tax competition than the PECO and can sustain higher corporate tax
rates.
To our knowledge, existing empirical studies on tax interactions all build
on the canonical models of tax competition according to which real capital
ows are only driven by di¤erences in scal policies. Thus, they focus on
the impact of capital mobility on tax interactions in order to test the tax
competition hypothesis. In reality, real capital ows are tightly related to
rmsstrategy to penetrate new markets. Numerous empirical studies show
that FDI ows are directed toward countries with a good market access (for
a survey, see Head and Mayer, 2004a). As a consequence, the sensitivity
of capital ows to corporate tax rates could depend on the most important
structural determinants of rmslocation choice, such as the proximity to
the biggest markets. Thus, the intensity of tax interaction between countries
could be strongly related with the level of trade integration. To test this
intuition, we evaluate the dependence of a countrys scal policy to the
scal policies of its most important trade partners.
Moreover, existing empirical studies deserve few attention on the expla-
nation of scal disparities. Despite the dependence on the other countries
scal policy, some countries could be able to set higher level of corporate tax
than others, because rms have non scal advantages to locate here that can
compensate them for higher corporate taxes. According to the New Eco-
nomic Geography literature, the proximity to the biggest markets is one of
these important locational advantages that could contribute to explain why
rms still locate in some high-tax countries such as countries of the G7 or
the EU-15. This result is conrmed in some empirical studies on rmssen-
sitivity to the scal policy that take into account agglomeration economies
(Brülhart et al. 2007, Devereux and Gri¢ th 1998, Head and Mayer 2004b).
However, existing studies on international tax interactions all do not con-
sider the potential impact of agglomeration economies on scal policies4.
We will try to ll this gap. Moreover, since NEG models of tax competition
4To our knowledge, Charlot and Paty (2007) are the only one whose empirical study
on tax interactions take into account agglomeration economies. They nd a positive re-
lationship between the tax rate of urban jurisdictions in France and their market access,
which suggests the existence of a taxable agglomeration rent.
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show the inuence on the scal policy of location forces coming from the
demand side, there is no reason why location forces coming from the supply
side would not inuence tax interactions as well. Indeed, the labor cost and
labor market rigidities can be important determinants of location choices
made by rms5. Thus, we might expect that high labor market rigidities,
by increasing the cost of labor and the level of unemployment, lead govern-
ments to decrease the level of corporate taxation to compensate rms for
the higher labor costs and to decrease the level of unemployment. There
are some theoretical papers showing that labor market imperfections a¤ect
tax competition (Ogawa et al. (2006), Boadway et al. (2004), Fuest and
Huber (1999)). However to our knowledge, none of the empirical studies on
tax interactions consider the potential e¤ects of labor market characteristics
on the scal policy. We will try to ll this gap by evaluating the impact of
labor market rigidities on tax interactions.
To summarize, we distinguish our study from the existing literature by
evaluating the impact of trade integration on tax interactions, and by eval-
uating the impact of location forces on corporate tax rates, whether they
come from the demand or the supply side. Our main results are as follows.
Firstly, we show the strongest tax interactions occur between countries that
are important trade partners. Secondly, corporate tax rates increase with
the market size and the market access of countries. As suggested by the
NEG literature on tax competition, agglomeration economies seem to allow
some governments to set higher corporate taxes, despite the dependence on
other countriesscal policies. Thus, we show that trade integration matters
for the tax policy through two channels: (i) on the one hand it reinforces
tax interactions and accelerates the race to the bottom in corporate taxes,
while (ii) on the other hand it makes it possible for countries to set higher
corporate tax rates by improving their market access. We show that the
second e¤ect becomes insignicant when we control for the rst one. This
could explain the negative relationship between trade integration and cor-
porate tax rates that we observed in OECD countries between 1983 and
1998. Finally, location forces coming from the labor market also inuence
the corporate tax policy since we show that the ability of countries to set
high corporate tax rate decreases with the degree of government involvement
in the wage-setting.
The paper will be organized as follows. In the following section, we es-
5Buettner and Ruf (2007) show that the probability that subsidiaries of German multi-
nationals locate in a country decreases with the labor cost in this country. Bartik (1985)
shows that high unionization has a very strong negative e¤ect on new business activity in
a state.
5
tablish some stylized facts about the evolution of corporate taxation and
economic integration in OECD countries during the last two decades. Cor-
porate tax rates in OECD countries have converged to the bottom over the
period 1982-1999, and this evolution was strongly related with the level of
economic integration. Thus, tax competition could have contributed to the
recent decline in corporate taxation in OECD countries. In order to test
this tax competition hypothesis and evaluate its intensity, we test reaction
functions over di¤erent measures of corporate tax rates of 17 OECD coun-
tries between 1982 and 1999. The data and the econometric method are
presented in section 3. Our strategy consists in estimating a reaction func-
tion over corporate taxes, using di¤erent measures of corporate taxation
and di¤erent weighting matrices to see between which kinds of countries tax
interactions are the strongest. Results are given in section 4, while the last
section concludes.
2 Some stylized facts
We begin by a description of the evolution of corporate taxation in 20 OECD
countries from 1982 to 2005. We observe a convergence to the bottom in
corporate tax rates combined with a broadening of the tax base. Then, we
use data on trade and foreign direct investment to see how far economic
integration has gone during this period. Finally, we show that this recent
trend of convergence to the bottom in corporate taxes is strongly related
with economic integration, as suggested by the tax competition literature.
2.1 Corporate taxation
To describe the evolution of corporate taxation, we have to choose an indi-
cator of the scal burden on rms. The measurement of corporate taxation
is by itself a eld of research that has experienced signicant improvements
recently6. We distinguish between two groups of corporate tax measures.
The rst one refers to ex post measures of corporate taxation dened as a
ratio of tax revenues over the tax base7. They are backward looking mea-
sures that cannot capture the impact of taxes on the behavior of rms. By
contrast, the second group is made of ex ante measures that take into ac-
count the scal legislation (statutory tax rate, depreciation allowances...) in
order to evaluate the impact of taxes on the expected prots of a typical
6The di¤erent measures of corporate taxation are surveyed by Devereux et al (2002).
7These measures are also called implicit rates of taxation.
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investment. Thus, they capture the inuence of the scal policy on rms
investment incentives, which is at the heart of the tax competition litera-
ture. For this reason, we will restrict our attention to ex ante measures of
corporate taxation.
We rst present the evolution of statutory tax rates and e¤ective tax
rates available from the database of Devereux et al. (2007a). While the
statutory tax rate is the most direct measure of the tax rate, the e¤ective
tax rates are theoretical measures combining information on both the tax
rate and the tax base in order to estimate the e¤ective scal burden on a
typical investment. We distinguish between the e¤ective average tax rate
(EATR) which is aimed at evaluating the impact of taxes on location choices
made by rms, and the e¤ective marginal tax rate (EMTR) that matters for
marginal investment choices made by rms conditional upon their previous
location choice (Devereux and Gri¢ th, 1998).
The evolution of these di¤erent measures of corporate tax rates is de-
picted in Figure 1 for 20 OECD countries between 1982 and 2005. The fall
in these measures of corporate taxation was fairly continuous and more pro-
nounced between 1985 and 1993 and between 1997 and 20028. Moreover,
this fall is more outstanding for the statutory tax rate (STATTAX) than for
the e¤ective tax rates that take into account the denition of the tax base,
which suggests a broadening of the tax base. Finally, the fall in the EATR
(-28,02%) was stronger than the fall in the EMTR (-21,61%).
 Stylized fact 1: On average, corporate tax rates have fallen in OECD
countries between 1982 and 2005 while the tax base was broadened9.
Looking at the evolution of the average level of corporate taxation in
OECD countries is interesting to capture a common trend. However, it
can be misleading to focus exclusively on this fact to evaluate the relevance
of the tax competition hypothesis. As Benassy-Quéré et al. (2005) point
out, the link between the tax level and the amount of investment located
in a country is not obvious. This is particularly true for discrete investment
choices. When a rm has to choose where to locate a new plant, what
matters for her is the di¤erence in taxation between countries rather than
8Spain is the only country in which the statutory corporate tax rate increased (by 2
points) during this period.
9This rst stilyzed fact suggests the race to the bottom in corporate taxes does not
systematically induce a fall in corporate tax revenues and public expenditures. As Dev-
ereux et al. (2002) show, share of GDP attributed to corporate tax revenues has remained
fairly stable from 1965 to 2000.
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Figure 1: Evolution of corporate tax rates
the absolute level of taxation in each country. Thus, we describe in Figure
2 the evolution of the disparities in corporate tax rates between countries.
The decline in the standard deviation indicates a convergence of corpo-
rate tax rates between 1982 and 2005. More precisely, it seems that periods
of strong decline in tax rates were combined with periods of strong conver-
gence, except over the period 1990-1994 characterized by a slight increase
in scal disparities and a decline in corporate tax rates. The strongest con-
vergence occurred with respect to the EART whose standard deviation was
divided by 2,94 between 1982 and 2005 while the standard deviation of the
statutory tax rate and the EMTR were divided by around 2. Despite this
convergence, observe that there are still important disparities in the level
of corporate tax rates. In 2005, the highest EATR was observed in Japan
and Netherlands (31,69%), while the lowest EATR was observed in Ireland
where it was twenty points lower.
 Stylized fact 2: The fall in the level of corporate taxation in OECD
countries between 1982 and 2005 was combined with a convergence of
corporate tax rates between these countries.
To summarize, there are two dimensions in the evolution of corporate
taxation in OECD countries that matter for tax competition and whose
evolutions are strongly related: the decline in corporate taxation levels in
each country, and their convergence between countries. Even if the con-
vergence to the bottom in corporate tax rates looks like an evidence of tax
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Figure 2: Evolution of the disparities of corporate taxation
competition, we cannot conclude anything from this observation. Recall that
according to the tax competition hypothesis, the decline in corporate tax
rates should be tightly related with the level of economic integration as far
as it a¤ects the tax base elasticity. Hence in the next subsection, we deal
with the link between the evolution of corporate taxes and the evolution of
economic integration.
2.2 Trade integration and factor mobility
Economic integration should matter for tax competition through two chan-
nels: the factor and the goods markets. Firstly, factor mobility is at the root
of tax competition. As we are interested in international tax competition,
we focus on economic integration on the capital market whose mobility is
much higher than labor mobility. Secondly, it is also important to take into
account the location forces driving capital ows. This is the main argument
of the NEG literature analyzing tax competition in a framework with bar-
riers to trade and increasing returns to scale (Ludema and Wooton (2000),
Kind et al. (2000), Anderson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman
(2004), Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005)). Among these location forces,
the level of trade integration plays an important role. On the one hand, the
fall in barriers to trade could make capital more responsive to variations
in corporate tax rates and strengthen tax competition (Ottaviano and Van
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Ypersele (2005), Gaigné and Riou (2007)). On the other hand, as capital
is unevenly distributed between countries, the decline in trade costs could
foster the agglomeration of capital in some countries, creating rents for this
factor that can be taxed without inducing a capital outow. Hence, trade
integration could make it possible for governments of these corecountries
to increase corporate taxes.
To approximate capital mobility and trade integration, we build indexes
based on the observation of trade and capital ows10. Capital mobility is
approximated by the ow of inward and outward Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) over the GDP. This measure is used in many empirical papers that
estimate the impact of capital mobility on corporate tax rates because FDI
data can be considered as a proxy for real capital ows (Garrett and Mitchell
(2001), Dreher (2006), Garretsen and Peeters (2007), Dreher et al. (2007)).
Regarding trade integration, we consider two di¤erent measures. The rst
one is trade openness (the sum of exportations and importations over the
GDP) which is used in all empirical studies dealing with the e¤ect of trade
integration on scal policies. While this index is easy to build, it is quite
inaccurate. By contrast, the literature on border e¤ects (Mc Callum (1995),
Wei (1996)) gives a method that allows to approximate more precisely the
degree of trade integration by comparing international trade ows to trade
ows at the subnational scale. We depart from this literature to build an
index of trade integration. More precisely, we depart from the bilateral index
of trade phi-nessdescribed by Head and Mayer (2004a) to build an index
of trade integration for each country of the sample. We believe this index is
much more accurate then the trade openness index since it is deduced from
a model of trade and location (the Dixit-Stigliz-Krugman model) while the
trade openness variable is an ad hoc measure.
The di¤erent steps of construction of this index of trade integration are
as follows. First, we use the Trade and Productiondatabase of Mayer and
Zignago (2005), which compiles data of bilateral trade and production for 67
developing and developed countries at the ISIC rev2 3-digit industry level (26
industrial sectors) over the period 1976-1999, to calculate a bilateral index of
trade phi-nessfor each industry. Then, we deduce a bilateral index of trade
phi-nessby weighting each sectorial index by the share of importations in
each industry to take into account the degree of protectionism of countries.
Thus, we get an asymmetric index of bilateral trade integration PHIijt
10We will call them e¤ective measures of economic integration because they are based
on the observation of trade and capital ows, as opposed to the measures that are based on
the legislation and register restrictions of capital and trade ows through capital controls
or tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers to trade.
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Figure 3: Evolution of economic integration
measuring accessibility of a given market i to imports from source j.11.
Finally, we adopt the same method of aggregation (weighting by countries
share of importations) to get the nal index of trade integration for each
country PHIit, which measures the accessibility of country i from all other
countries of the database. These di¤erent steps of construction of the trade
phiness index are summarized in the appendix A.2.
The Figure 3 shows the evolution of these measures of capital mobility
and trade integration for 17 OECD countries12. In average, FDI ows over
the GDP increased more than vefold between 1983 and 1999. Trade in-
tegration also increased and this increase is more pronounced for the trade
phi-ness index (+22.62%) than for the index of trade openness (+14.63%).
Thus, it seems that the trade openness index underestimates the deepening
of trade integration.
Therefore, the convergence to the bottom in corporate tax rates occurred
during a period of increasing economic integration on capital and goods mar-
kets. More accurately, there is a negative correlation between corporate tax
11By contrast, the bilateral index of trade phi-ness coming from the D-S-K is sym-
metric because of the hypothesis of symmetric trade costs in this model. Our weigthing
scheme based on the share of importations in each industry allows to get an asymmetric
index of bilateral trade integration.
12We restrict our attention on the 17 OECD countries for which data was available for
all these indexes and for all measures of corporate taxation.
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rates and economic integration. To see whether the decline and convergence
in corporate tax rates were related with the deepening of economic inte-
gration, we report in Table 1 the correlation coe¢ cient between the yearly
average of corporate tax rates and the yearly average of measures of eco-
nomic integration, while we report in Table 2 the correlation between the
yearly standard deviation of corporate tax rates and the yearly average of
measures of economic integration.
Correl. coe¢ cient Trade phi-ness Trade ows / GDP FDI ows / GDP
STATTAX  0:900  0:757  0:621
EART  0:915  0:797  0:656
EMRT  0:918  0:854  0:701
Table 1: Correlation between economic integration and corporate tax rates
Correl. coe¢ cient Trade phi-ness Trade ows / GDP FDI ows / GDP
STATTAX (std dev)  0:849  0:740  0:780
EART (std dev)  0:861  0:695  0:722
EMRT (std dev)  0:797  0:567  0:576
Table 2: Correlation between economic integration and corporate tax dis-
parities
The highest correlation coe¢ cients associate corporate tax rates (levels
and standard deviation) to the trade phi-ness index. Interestingly, the choice
of the measure of trade integration really matters since there is a signicant
di¤erence between the correlation coe¢ cients relating corporate tax rates to
the trade-phiness index and those relating corporate tax rates to the trade
openness index. With a simple linear regression depicted in Figure 4, we
can see the very strong correlation between the EATR and the trade phiness
index.
 Stylized fact 4: The recent trend of convergence to the bottom in cor-
porate tax rates was strongly related with the level of trade integration.
Hence, because of the deepening of economic integration, governments
of OECD countries might behaved strategically with respect to their scal
policy by diminishing their corporate taxes in order to keep capital within
their national borders. To test this tax competition hypothesis, we need to
adopt an econometric approach that we describe in the next section.
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3 Econometric method and data
There are two di¤erent ways to test the tax competition hypothesis. While
many empirical studies evaluate the direct impact of economic integration
on corporate tax rates (Quinn, 1997, Swank, 2002, Bretschger and Hettisch,
2002, Dreher, 2006, Schwarz (2006), Rodrik (1997), Garrett and Mitchell
(2001), Winner (2005)), we believe that relying on the estimation of reaction
functions is a better strategy for two main reasons: (i) this approach is closer
to the theory and (ii) it allows to evaluate the intensity of tax competition
through the estimated slope of the reaction function.
Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005) give an excellent description of the
empirical approach to estimate scal interactions13. According to the tax
competition hypothesis, the amount of mobile tax base invested in a coun-
try i (bi) depends on the corporate tax rate of that country (ti), on the
vector of tax rates in the other countries (t i) and on a vector of economic
characteristics of country i (Yi). One of the main drawback of the standard
literature on tax competition, which assumes a neoclassical framework, is
that it does not allow to dene variables of the vector Yi. Indeed, capital
ows in these models are exclusively driven by di¤erences in scal policies.
13They deal with scal interactions coming from tax competition, yardstick competition
(Besley and Case, (1995)), welfare competition (Wildasin (1991) et Brueckner (2000)) and
expenditure spillovers (Case et al. (1993)).
13
By contrast, the literature of the NEG assuming imperfect competition, in-
creasing returns to scale and trade costs, provides a framework that gives
also non scal determinants of the capital ows. Thus, the amount of
capital invested in country i is given by the following function:
bi = H (ti; t i;Yi) (1)
with dbi=dti < 0 and dbi=dtj > 0. These properties mean that an unilateral
increase in country is tax rate or a decrease in other countriestax rates
generates a capital outow from country i. Empirical studies estimating
tax base elasticities support these properties (for a survey, see de Mooij and
Ederveen (2003)).
Given this function of tax base allocation, the government of each coun-
try is supposed to maximize its residentsutility, which depends on their
consumption of private goods (ci), public goods (gi), and on a vector of
national characteristics (Xi) such as the demographic structure of the pop-
ulation. Thus, the total welfare of residents of country i is given by the
function:
ui = u (ci (bi) ; gi (bi) ;Xi) (2)
To summarize, assuming that governments are benevolent and that they
are aware of the way capital owners choose where to invest, we get their
objective function by inserting the function (1) in residentsutility function
(2). The maximization of this objective function with respect to ti gives the
rst order condition and the resulting reaction function over corporate taxes
that we want to estimate:
ti = t (t i;t;Xi;Yi) (3)
Assuming linearity of the reaction function, testing the tax competition
hypothesis requires to estimate the following regression:
ti;t =
X
j 6=i
ijttjt + 
0
1Yit + 
0
2Xit + 0 + "it (4)
where ijt is the slope of the reaction function between country i and j
at year t, and "i;t is the error term. According to NEG models of tax
competition, the slopes should be positive and increase with the strength of
scal interactions14.
14We do not deal with the specic case of asymetric competition between a country
without mobile capital and a country with all capital.
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3.1 Data set
We constructed a panel of data from 17 OECD countries over the period
1983-199915. These countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany,
Spain, Finland, France, Great-Britain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Portugal and the United States of America.
Data denitions, summary statistics, and sources are given in Table 6 of
Appendix A.5.
Dependent variable Let us rst describe the choice of the dependent
variable of corporate taxation tit. Since both the tax rate and the tax base
are relevant in determining incentives for investment, governments should
act strategically with respect to their e¤ective tax rates in order to a¤ect the
location of the tax base the more e¢ ciently as possible. However in practice,
changing the denition of the tax base can be very costly for governments
and the comparison of tax base across countries can be very complicated for
rms16. For these reasons, tax competition could essentially occur over the
statutory tax rates, easily handled by governments and whose comparison
across countries by rms is more direct.
In order to know with respect to which measure of corporate taxation
scal interactions are the strongest, we estimate reaction functions over both
e¤ective tax rates and the statutory tax rate. The comparison of the results
with the two measures of e¤ective tax rates (marginal and average) can also
be interesting. Indeed, recall that the e¤ective marginal tax rate is relevant
for marginal investments that do not generate prots, contrary to discrete
investments that depend on the e¤ective average tax rate. Thus, we could
expect tax competition for the discrete investments (over the EART) to be
ercer than tax competition for marginal investments (over the EMRT).
Vector Yit Recall that variables of the vector Yit refer to non scal
variables that matter for the location of the tax base across countries. We
rely on the NEG literature to choose these variables.
Let us consider models of tax competition within a NEG framework with
mobile capital and immobile labor (Baldwin et al., 2003, Ottaviano and
15We depart from the tax database of Devereux et al. (2007a) which gives di¤erent
measures of corporate taxation for 20 OECD countries. We lose 3 countries from this
database because of data availibility problems with respect to the other variables of the
regression. The nal sample is balanced.
16The denition of e¤ective tax rates, taking into account the denition of the tax base,
involves complex rules and hypotheses that make their comparison across countries quite
di¢ cult.
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Van Ypersele 2005, Hauer and Wooton 2007, Gaigné and Riou, 2007)17.
Assuming equal corporate taxes in all countries, these models predict that
capital will be drawn to areas with good access to major markets for nal
goods, because rms want to save on trade costs and exploit increasing
returns to scale. Thus, trade integration plays a major role in the spatial
distribution of the tax base. The lower trade costs are, the more rms located
in a country raise prots by deserving foreign demand through exportation.
Said di¤erently, the attractiveness of a country i increases with its market
potential, which was rst dened by Harris (1964) as the sum of demand
emanating from all countries divided by their bilateral distance with respect
to country i. These location forces matter for the tax competition outcome.
Indeed, the agglomeration of rms in the biggest markets creates rents for
this factor that can be taxed by the government without inducing a capital
outow, allowing the biggest countries to set higher corporate tax rates.
This could contribute to explain why G7 countries set higher corporate taxes
without eroding their attractiveness.
We test this theoretical prediction by adding two variables in the vector
Yit that allow to distinguish between the local and the non local component
of the market potential. The rst variable is the national apparent consump-
tion of country i (ABSit, dened as production - exports + imports) which
is a proxy for its national market size. The second variable is the market ac-
cess (MAit) that captures the non local component of the market potential.
It is dened as the sum of demand coming from high income countries j 6= i
multiplied by the bilateral trade phi-ness index between country i and j18.
We expect these variables to have a positive e¤ect on corporate taxation.
Vector Xit Variables of the vector Xit does not necessarily matter for the
tax base location but could a¤ect residentswelfare and thus governments
scal policy through other channels.
 The size of the public sector is approximated by a variable public
consumption over the GDP, lagged one year to avoid an endogeneity
17We restrict our attention to the NEG models characterized by labor immobility and
(physical) capital mobility because these models are more adapted to deal with interna-
tional tax competition than models with labor mobility.
18An alternative to build the market access variable is to follow Harris by calculating
the sum of demand from other countries divided by their distance with respect to country
i. This is done by Charlot and Paty (2007). The main drawback of this approach is that
the inverse of distance is an inaccurate proxy for trade integration. Thus, we prefer to
build our market access variable by approximating trade integration by the bilateral trade
integration index described in appendix A.2.
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bias (PCONSi;t 1). We expect this variable to have a positive impact
on the corporate tax rate as it calls for more scal revenues to nance
public goods.
 We introduce the highest domestic income tax (TINCit) because of the
possibility of interdependence between this tax rate and the corporate
tax rate. On the one hand, we could observe a positive relationship
between these two tax rates because the corporate tax rate could act
as a backstop for the income tax. Indeed, individuals could be incited
to escape tax on their earnings by incorporating themselves19. On the
other hand, the corporate tax and the income tax could be substitutes
according to the tax competition hypothesis since governments could
report the scal burden on the less mobile tax bases.
 We also introduce socio-demographic variables to control for the e¤ect
of the structure of population on the scal policy. Among the demo-
graphic variables, we introduce the share of young people (Y OUit),
the share of old people (OLDit) and the share of people living in ur-
ban areas (URBit). Moreover, we follow Cassette and Paty (2007) by
introducing a variable of standardized unemployment rate, lagged one
year to avoid an endogeneity bias (UNEMPi;t 1). Indeed, a high level
of unemployment could give governments an additional incentive to
decrease corporate taxation to favor job creation by domestic rms or
to prevent their delocalization20.
 Finally, we control for the impact of the business cycle on the s-
cal policy with a variable of GDP growth from year t   1 to year t
(GDPGRit). On the one hand, economic growth could result in lower
corporate taxation. Indeed, a positive productivity shock increases
the home interest rate, which induces a capital inow. Thus, govern-
ments could lower their tax rates during economic upturns to have a
balanced budget (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002). On the other hand,
a strong economic growth increases rms protability and the corpo-
rate tax base so that governments could sustain higher corporate tax
rates while they would reduce corporate tax rates in periods of slow
economic growth to stimulate the economy (Basinger and Hallerberg,
2004).
19Gordon and Slemrod (2000) and Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) estimate this
e¤ect and its policy implication.
20The eligibility for tax deductions or subsidies given by governments is sometimes
contingent on a minimum employment level.
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3.2 Econometric issues
We have to deal with four main problems to estimate the reaction function
over corporate taxes (4).
Degree of freedom Firstly, it is impossible to estimate the regression (4)
as it stands. In theory, each government could respond di¤erently to the
tax rates of every other countries. However there are too much parameters
to estimate with such a regression. Hence, we follow the empirical literature
by replacing the vector of other countriestax rates t i;t by the average tax
rate of those countries t i;t dened as:
t i;t =
X
j 6=i
!ijt  tjt (5)
where !ijt are exogenous weights of a matrix and are normalized such thatP
j 6=i !ijt = 1
21. Thus, the estimated equation written in matrix form is:
t = Wt+ yY + xX + " (6)
with W the weighting matrix made of weights !ijt for each pair of countries
i; j. The sensitivity of country is corporate tax rate to country js tax
rate will be given by the expression @tit=@tjt = ^!ijt, while the estimated
coe¢ cient ^ gives the sensitivity of country is scal policy to all countries
of the sample. As Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Brueckner (2003)
indicate, the weights are imposed ex ante and chosen in order to identify
between which types of countries scal interactions are the strongest. We
consider ve possible weighting schemes to calculate (5). In the Table 5 of
the appendix A.4, we report the ve pairs of countries for which the weight
attributed to country j by country i in the choice of its scal policy are the
highest in 1999, for each weighting matrix.
According to the tax competition literature, economic integration is at
the heart of scal interdependencies between countries. As a consequence,
we expect tax interactions to be stronger between well integrated countries.
Tax interactions come only from capital mobility according to the standard
literature of tax competition. By contrast, NEG models of tax competition
endogenize capital mobility by taking into account international trade ows
and show that what really matters is the process of trade integration that
21This normalization is necessary to get comparable coe¢ cients of scal interactions
across the di¤erent matrices.
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makes capital more responsive to scal policies. Thus, we build matrices
based on integration on the capital and the goods market.
We rst follow the empirical literature on tax interactions by using a
matrix based on FDI ows (WFDI) to capture integration on the capital
market. More precisely, we follow Cassette and Paty (2007) by choosing an
index of intensity of FDI in countries with which country i is in interaction.
The elements of this matrix are given by:
!FDIij;t = FDIj;t 1=
X
j 6=i
FDIj;t 1
with FDIj;t 1 the sum of inward and outward FDI ows over GDP in coun-
try j. Weights are lagged one year in order to avoid endogeneity problems22.
A high and signicant coe¢ cient associated to this weighting matrix (^
FDI
)
would mean that a government is more sensitive to the tax policy of other
countries when those countries generate or hosts important ows of FDI.
According to this weighting scheme, in 1999, many OECD countries should
choose their tax rate depending on the scal policy of Sweden (see Table 5).
While the matrix WFDI is aimed at capturing only the mobility of real
capital, it also captures international trade ows that are associated with
these FDI ows. Thus, we would like to evaluate the e¤ect of trade integra-
tion on interactional tax interactions. Most of the empirical studies on tax
interactions do not investigate this. They just consider the trade openness
variable as a control variable in the tax reaction function (Devereux et al
(2007a), Redoano (2007), Cassette and Paty (2007)). The only exception is
Redoano (2007). However, its weighting matrix is based on the trade open-
ness variable which is quite inaccurate. In order to disentangle the e¤ect of
trade integration on tax interactions, we build a weighting matrix (WPHI)
based on the bilateral index of trade phiness PHIijt averaged over the ve
previous years. More precisely, the elements of this weighting matrix are:
!PHIijt = PHIijt=
X
j 6=i
PHIijt
A high and signicant coe¢ cient associated to this weighting matrix (^
PHI
)
could result from the positive impact of trade integration on the tax base
elasticity that could lead governments to act more strategically with respect
to their corporate tax policy. Observe from Table 5 that the pair of countries
22There is a large body of empirical literature that show the impact of corporate tax
rates on FDI ows (Benassy-Quéré et al. (2005), de Mooij et Ederveen (2003)).
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for which we get the highest weights are Canada-USA (the weight attributed
to the Canadian scal policy by the US government reaches 0.68 while the
weight given to the US scal policy by the Canadian government is 0.48).
Then, we get the weight given by the Irish government to the Bristish scal
policy (0.34), the weight given by the Finnish government to the Swedish
scal policy (0.31), and the weight given by the Austrian government to the
German scal policy (0.30).
We also build a weighting matrix (WDIST ) that takes into account the
geographic distance between countries and which is constructed as follows:
!DISTij =
1
distij
=
X
j 6=i
1
distij
with distij the geodesic distance between country i and j23. This is also a
proxy for the degree of economic integration since trade costs and the costs
of capital mobility increase with the distance.
Moreover, we can expect scal interactions to be stronger between coun-
tries with similar economic characteristics. Thus, we follow Redoano (2007)
and Cassette and Paty (2007) by building a weighting matrixWGDPC based
on the inverse of the distance between GDP per capita, such that:
!GDPCijt =
1
jGDPCit  GDPCjtj=
X
j 6=i
1
jGDPCit  GDPCjtj
with GDPCit the GDP per capita.
As suggested by Redoano (2007), we also introduce a matrix based on
economic leadership WGDPL, to test the possibility that countries choose
their scal policy by following a leader country. The weights of this matrix
are dened as follows:
!PIBTLij;t = PIBTj;t 1=
X
j 6=i
PIBTj;t 1
Finally, we use a uniform matrix (WUNI) such that the corporate tax
rate of each country is equally weighted:
!UNIij = 1= (n  1)
This uniform matrix plays the role of benchmark since it gives the strength of
scal interdependencies between countries whatever their characteristics. If
23We used the CEPII database on bilateral distances.
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the coe¢ cient ^
UNI
is signicant and higher than the coe¢ cients induced by
the other matrices, it will support Manskis (1993) hypothesis of common
intellectual trendthat drives countries scal choices in the same directions
independently of their level of economic integration.
Endogeneity Strategic interactions over corporate tax rates imply that
they are simultaneously determined. Hence, the average corporate tax rate
of other countries t i;t is correlated with the residuals (Anselin (1988)).
We use the instrumental variables method to deal with this endogeneity
bias24. More precisely, as suggested by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and
Kelejian and Prucha (1998), we regress in a rst stepWt onWX and use the
predicted values W^ t as instruments for Wt25. Moreover, the variable of top
income tax rate should also be treated as endogenous since the governments
could decide simultaneously its corporate tax rate and its income tax rate.
We follow Devereux et al. (2007b) by instrumenting the variable TINCit
by its lagged value. We test the validity of these instruments by the Hansen
test of over-identifying restrictions.
Finally, the market size and market access variables could also be endoge-
nous, since demand comes in part from mobile entrepreneurs whose location
choices should depend on the corporate tax policy. We lagged those variables
for one year to avoid an endogeneity bias.
Heterogeneity We need to account for spatial and temporal heterogene-
ity since it could involve non observable characteristics that matter for the
scal policy. Hence, we introduce xed country e¤ects i. However, as De-
vereux et al. (2007a) explain, we cannot introduce year dummies to capture
shocks in each period which are common to all countries. Indeed, observe
that when we use the uniform matrix, the e¤ect of the year dummy is already
present in variable t i;t, that we can rewrite t i;t = (tt   ti;t) = (n  1) with
tt the sum of tax rates of all the countries of the sample. Hence, instead of
a year dummy, we take into account unobservable factors varying over time
through a linear time trend common to all countries Tt26.
24We use the xtivreg2 command of Stata to implement the IV method.
25As Brueckner (2003) suggests, other possibility to deal with this endogeneity bias
would be to estimate the reaction function by maximum likelyhood (ML) methods. How-
ever, we prefer to use the IV method this method generates a consistent estimate of ^
even in the presence of spatial error dependence (Kelejian and Prucha (1998)).
26We also estimated the regressions with a country specic linear time trend. The results
are very similar to those we get with a common time trend.
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Serial correlation We observe a strong inertia in the evolution of corpo-
rate tax rates over time. There are several reasons for this inertia: abrupt
changes in tax rates might involve too important adjustments costs for the
private sector, and they are politically di¢ cult to defend because of the pres-
sure coming from interest groups who lose from these changes (see Devereux
et al. (2007a)). A direct consequence of this inertia is serial correlation. In
order to deal with this bias, we follow Devereux et al. (2007b) by including
a lagged dependent variable. As it is well known, this lagged dependent
variable is correlated with the xed e¤ects, and thus treating it as exoge-
nous may lead to biased estimates. We address this problem by treating
this variable as endogenous and instrumenting it by the second lag of the
dependent variable. We also present the results of Wooldridges test of serial
correlation27.
To summarize, we will estimate the following regression with spatial and
temporal autoregression:
tit = ti;t 1 + t i;t + 0yYit + 
0
xXit + Tt + i + "it (7)
4 Results
We begin by a description of the results with the EATR as dependent vari-
able. We rst estimate the impact of agglomeration economies and trade
integration inuence tax interactions. Then, we undertake some robustness
checks. Finally, we investigate the role played by the labor market in tax
competition by adding in the vectorYit variables which refer to labor market
characteristics.
4.1 Do trade integration and agglomeration economies inu-
ence scal interactions?
We rst estimate the autoregressive spatial regression (7) with the con-
straints that  = 0. The results show a strong serial correlation and are not
reported. We address this problem by estimating the autoregressive spatial
( 6= 0) and temporal ( 6= 0) model. Results of this estimation are re-
ported in Table 3, where each column refers to the weighting scheme used
to calculate the variable of average EATR in other countries.
The lagged dependent variable is strongly signicant, as we expected. Its
coe¢ cient varies between 0.675 and 0.712, which shows a high persistence
27An alternative solution to deal with serial correlation is to estimate of the reaction
function in dynamic panel. This is done by Cassette and Paty (2007) and Redoano (2007).
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Weigthing matrix WUNI WPIBTL WPHI WIDE WDIST
Lagged EART
(ti;t 1)
EATR of countries j 6= i
(t i;t)
Top income tax rate
(TINCit)
Share of old people
(OLDit)
Share of young people
(Y OUit)
Share of urban people
(URBit)
Pub. cons. expenditures
(PCONSi;t 1)
Market size
(ABSit)
Market access
(MAit)
Unemployment rate
(UNEMPi;t 1)
GDP growth
(GDPGRit)
Trend
(Tt)
0:712a
(0:077)
0:705a
(0:077)
0:675a
(0:086)
0:704a
(0:077)
0:680a
(0:085)
0:463c
(0:237)
0:492c
(0:256)
0:609b
(0:293)
0:318c
(0:167)
0:486c
(0:253)
0:040
(0:038)
0:045
(0:035)
0:020
(0:041)
0:040
(0:038)
0:021
(0:042)
 0:180
(0:295)
 0:132
(0:302)
 0:263
(0:302)
 0:140
(0:299)
 0:301
(0:289)
 0:235
(0:154)
 0:206
(0:154)
 0:074
(0:165)
 0:201
(0:154)
 0:298c
(0:165)
 0:110
(0:172)
 0:095
(0:173)
0:090
(0:188)
 0:089
(0:170)
 0:141
(0:183)
 0:061
(0:042)
 0:060
(0:042)
 0:023
(0:044)
 0:055
(0:042)
 0:049
(0:043)
0:006b
(0:003)
0:006b
(0:003)
0:003
(0:002)
0:006b
(0:002)
0:004c
(0:002)
0:007c
(0:004)
0:007c
(0:004)
0:002
(0:004)
0:007c
(0:004)
0:002
(0:004)
 0:149
(0:109)
 0:154
(0:113)
0:004
(0:110)
 0:149
(0:108)
 0:061
(0:105)
0:023
(0:032)
0:015
(0:031)
0:012
(0:032)
0:021
(0:031)
0:025
(0:033)
0:001
(0:001)
0:001
(0:001)
0:002
(0:002)
0:000
(0:001)
0:001
(0:001)
Country xed e¤ects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
Hansen statistic (prob)
Serial correlation test (prob)
Endogeneity test of t i;t (prob)
Endogeneity test of TINCi;t (prob)
yes yes yes yes yes
272 272 272 272 272
0:801 0:799 0:795 0:802 0:798
0:345 0:882 0:591 0:283 0:561
0:171 0:130 0:274 0:178 0:194
0:002 0:006 0:065 0:008 0:057
0:002 0:005 0:013 0:002 0:016
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. asignicant at 10%, b signicant at 5%,
csignicant at 1%.
Table 3: Estimation of tax interactions over the EATR
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of EATR over time. The equation now passes the serial correlation test of
Wooldridges (2002), except with the weighting matrix based on the di¤er-
ence in GDP per capita (WGDPC) whose results are not reported. Moreover,
results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity indicate that vari-
ables tit and TINCit are endogenous and need to be instrumented. Finally,
the equation passes the test of overidentifying restrictions with all matrices
at conventional signicance levels.
The coe¢ cient of scal interactions, ^, is signicant at 10% and posi-
tive for all weighting matrices. It reaches its lowest value (0.318) with the
matrix based on FDI intensity (WFDI) and its highest value (0.609) with
the matrix based on the level of bilateral trade integration (WPHI). The
estimated coe¢ cients are quite similar to those estimated by Devereux et
al. (2007a) on the EMRT of 21 OECD countries over the same period and
to those estimated by Cassette and Paty (2007) on the statutory tax rate
of 27 European countries between 1995 and 2005. The fact that the coef-
cient ^ reaches its highest value and level of signicance with the matrix
based on the bilateral levels of trade integration WPHI indicates that s-
cal interactions are the strongest between important trade partners. Thus,
tax competition would be the most intense between Canada and the USA
and between Ireland and Great-Britain. This result contrasts with those
of Redoano (2007) who nd a signicant impact of trade openness on tax
interactions over statutory tax rate in UE countries, but with a coe¢ cient
twice lower than the one we get using a measure of trade phi-ness28. This
high level of ^
PHI
could result from the positive impact of trade integration
on the tax base elasticity, as suggested by NEG models of tax competition29.
Said di¤erently, a high level of trade integration between countries would
make location choices more and more sensitive to tax di¤erentials between
countries, so that governments would be more and more dependent on the
scal policy of their most important trade partners. Moreover, observe that
the lowest coe¢ cient of tax interaction is the induced by the matrix WFDI .
The fact that ^
PHI
is higher and more signicant than ^
FDI
suggests that
maybe this is not capital mobility per se that matters for tax competition
but rather the trade integration process. However, the matrix based on
the index of capital mobility yields the highest R2. Thus, both channels of
economic integration seem to matter for tax competition.
28Moreover, results of Redoano might be biased upward as she does not control for the
positive impact of the income tax on the statutory tax rate.
29To our knowledge, the impact of trade integration on tax base elasticity has not been
investigated empirically yet and it would be very interesting to test whether the fall in
trade costs reinforces tax base elasticity or not.
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Among the control variables (Xit), the share of young people is the
only one that a¤ects signicantly the EART, when the matrix based on
the inverse of distance is used. As Devereux et al. (2007a), we nd a
negative sign associated to this variable. Public expenditures do not a¤ect
signicantly the EATR as in Slemrod (2004). More surprisingly, the income
tax rate is also insignicant. This result contrasts with those of Cassette and
Paty (2007), Devereux et al. (2007a) and Slemrod (2004) who nd that the
income tax rate has a signicantly positive impact on the level of corporate
taxation. Finally, the variable of unemployment rate is not signicant.
While we were expecting the unemployment rate to induce governments to
decrease corporate taxation to favor job creation, this does not appear to be
the case because of the ambiguous impact of unemployment on rms location
choice. As Disdier and Mayer (2004) explain, a high level of unemployment
might signal the availability of a large pool of workers which could have
a positive e¤ect on location choice made by rms, but it might also deter
investments if this unemployment results from strong rigidities on the labor
market.
Now I come to variables of the vector Yit that should matter for rms
location choices and thus for the tax base elasticity. As predicted by the
NEG models of tax competition, the market size and the market access both
have a positive impact on the EART. These results are consistent with those
of Garretsen and Peeters (2007) who show that the corporate tax rate of
OECD countries is positively related with their market potential. Moreover,
the fact that the market access variable is positive and signicant indicates
that contrary to Devereux et al. (2007a) and Redoano (2007), trade inte-
gration might have also a direct e¤ect on government scal policy30. While
these results are consistent with predictions made the NEG models of tax
competition, they should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, we can see
in the third column that these variables are no more signicant when the
matrix based on bilateral trade integration is used. There is an explanation
for this result. By denition, the market access variable takes into account
interdependencies between countries since it is based on bilateral trade phi-
ness. This bilateral trade phiness is also taken into account in the variable
of average EART of other countries when the weighting scheme is based on
trade integration WPHI . Thus, the regression using the matrix WPHI is
the only one that include the two channels through which trade integration
might a¤ect scal choices: (i) the impact of trade integration on tax interac-
30Devereux et al. (2007a) and Redoano (2007) nd no signicant impact of trade open-
ness on corporate tax rates.
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tions through the tax base elasticity is captured by the variable t i;t, while
(ii) the impact of trade integration on scal choices through agglomeration
economies is captured by the market access variable. The fact that only the
e¤ect (i) is signicant suggests that the net e¤ect of trade integration on
corporate taxation is negative, so that OECD countries would be concerned
by the downward sloping part of the non-monotonous relationship between
trade integration and corporate tax rates predicted by some NEG models of
tax competition.
4.2 Robustness checks
If the previous results give evidence on tax interactions over the EATR, it
is more di¢ cult to identify the source of these interactions. Indeed, there
are di¤erent models that predict such scal interactions (Brueckner, 2003,
Revelli, 2005).
Firstly, what looks like scal interactions might result from a common
intellectual trend, as suggested by Manski (1993). Since scal interactions
are always signicant with the uniform matrix, we cannot reject this hypoth-
esis. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the tax competition hypothesis as well
for two reasons. As Brueckner (2003) concludes in his paper, the evidence
of tax competition should be appreciated from estimates of the structural
equations that generate the reaction function. Since there is a growing lit-
erature showing that high corporate taxes deter investments (De Mooij and
Ederveen (2003)), we cannot reject the tax competition hypothesis. More-
over, the comparison of the estimated slopes on the reaction function gives
evidence of tax competition. Indeed, observe that all weighting matrices ex-
cept WFDI yields higher coe¢ cient of tax interactions than the uniform
matrix. Thus, the strength of tax interactions is higher between neighbor-
ing countries, between important trade partners or with respect to leader
countries. To summarize, there is empirical evidence that support the tax
competition hypothesis with respect to both the auxiliary equation (the tax
base elasticity) and the reduced form equation (the tax reaction function).
Secondly, tax interactions could result from yardstick competition (Besley
and Case (1995), Besley and Smart (2003), Bordignon et al. (2003, 2004)).
It occurs when policy makers in one country adjust their policy in response
to neighboring countries because citizens compare domestic and foreign poli-
cies to make their voting decisions. However, as Redoano (2007) explains,
yardstick competition is more likely to occur with respect to those policies
that voters care the most. As far as corporate taxes hit income from capital
and are of interest for a minority of voters, we can consider that the risk of
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yardstick competition over corporate tax rates is limited. Moreover, in case
of yardstick competition over corporate tax rates, the strength of scal in-
teractions would not increase with the level of trade integration. Hence, tax
interactions over corporate tax rates does not seem to result from yardstick
competition.
To summarize, tax competition could be just one reason among others
that explains why countries should be a¤ected by their neighborswhen
they set their scal policy. What matters is the relative importance of
the tax competition hypothesis with respect to the other ones. In order
to discriminate between these di¤erent explanations, most of the empirical
studies just compare the predicted value of ^ depending on the weighting
matrices used. The fact that the matrices WPHI , WDIST , and WPIBTL
yield the highest level of tax interactions suggests that the tax competition
hypothesis is quite strong since tax interactions are the strongest between
well integrated countries while according to the common intellectual trend
hypothesis or the yardstick competition hypothesis, the strength of tax in-
teractions should not be related to the level of economic integration. Inter-
estingly, the lowest coe¢ cient of tax interaction is induced by the matrix
based on capital mobility WFDI why we expected from the tax competi-
tion hypothesis that this weighting scheme would induce a high coe¢ cient.
This might result from the two important weaknesses of the index of capital
mobility based on FDI data. Firstly, FDI data are a very imperfect proxy
for real capital ows since 60% of FDI ows result from mergers and ac-
quisitions in developed countries (OECD, 2000). These nancial ows react
di¤erently to corporate taxation (Auerbach and Hassett (1993). Swensson
(2001) showed, by distinguishing between six forms of FDI, that corporate
tax deter real investments in US States while they have a positive impact on
the amount of FDI associated to mergers and acquisitions. Since the FDI
variable encompasses those two kinds of capital ows, we might underes-
timate the strength of tax interactions between countries characterized by
important real capital ows. Secondly, this measure of FDI ows over the
GDP su¤er from the same limits as the trade openness variable as far as it is
an ad hoc index. It would be interesting to improve this index of economic
integration on the capital market to see if it changes the results31.
31Devereux et al. (2007a) address this problem by running regressions which allow for
the reaction function coe¢ cients to vary with the strength of legal controls on capital
movements in both the country setting the tax and the average of such controls across
all the other countries with which that country is competing. However, their weigthing
matrix taking into account economic integration of the capital market is still based on
FDI ows over the GDP.
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To evaluate the relevance of the tax competition hypothesis with respect
to the other ones, it seems also interesting to compare the results of the
regressions with respect to the dependent variable. In the Table of the
appendix A.5., we give the results of the estimation across the di¤erent
measures of corporate taxation with the matrix WPHI32. Firstly, we expect
tax competition to be stronger over protable investments. Thus, we expect
tax interactions to be stronger over the EATR than other the EMTR. The
results conrm this intuition. Indeed, observe rst that the adjusted R2
induced by the estimation of tax reaction over the EART (0.795) is higher
than the adjusted R2 of the tax reaction over the EMTR (0.752). Moreover,
the coe¢ cient of tax interactions over the EMRT is non signicant while
it is signicant at 5% with respect to the EATR. Thus, if there is scal
competition, it seems to be to attract protable investments, which show
the limits of the standard literature on capital tax competition in a neoclassic
framework. Secondly, we expect tax interactions over the statutory tax rate
(STATTAXit) to important and signicant for three reasons: (i) it could
be easier for governments to manipulate statutory tax rate than to change
the denition of the tax base, (ii) the comparison of statutory tax rate
between countries is easier for rms than the comparison of EATR, and
(iii) governments could compete over statutory tax rate to attract prots
made by multinationals having a tax optimization behavior (Devereux et al,
2007a). Our results are consistent with this intuition, the highest predictive
power (with a R2 equal to 0.803) comes from the estimation of the tax
reaction function over statutory tax rates, which also yields the highest
coe¢ cient of tax interactions (^
PHI
= 0:684).
To conclude, even if we cannot completely disentangle the extent to
which estimated tax interactions come from tax competition, there is evi-
dence that tax competition contributes to the explanation of these interde-
pendencies since: (i) tax interactions are stronger between trade partners,
(ii) there are tax interactions over the EATR but not over the EMTR, (iii)
the strongest tax interactions occur over statutory tax rates.
4.3 Do labor market rigidities inuence tax interactions?
The above results indicate that both trade integration and the location
of demand matter for scal choices of governments. What about location
forces coming from the supply side? The existing models of tax competition
32We do not give the results with the other weigthing matrices as they do not pass the
serial correlation test of the test of over-identication of restrictions.
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for (physical) capital within NEG frameworks do not answer this question.
Indeed, as they assume physical capital to be internationally mobile and
human capital to be immobile, the wage of immobile workers is normalized
to unity through the traditional sector. Thus, rms location choice does
not depend on the labor cost, while in reality location choices can be partly
driven by the search for lower labor costs. Several empirical studies show
that high labor costs deter investments (Buettner and Ruf (2007), Bartik
(1985), Crozet et al., 2004, Mayer et Muchielli, 1999, Cheng et Kwan, 2000,
Buettner et Ruf, 2007), even if others show that its e¤ect is positive or non
signicant (Devereux and Gri¢ th, 1998; Head et al., 1999, Benassy et al.,
2005)33.
As far as labor costs can a¤ect rms location choice, they could also
inuence scal choices made by governments. However, few models of tax
competition deal with the impact of the labor market characteristics on
tax competition. In an extension of the model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1989), Sato et al. (2006) show that tax competition is ercer when a mini-
mum wage rate is applied provided that labor and capital are complements.
Likewise, Exbrayat et al. (2007) show, in a model of trade and rm location,
that labor market imperfections (through a minimum wage or through wage
bargaining by a monopoly union) reinforce the tax base elasticity, and thus
foster tax competition.
To our knowledge, none of the empirical studies on tax competition
consider the potential role for labor market imperfections and the labor cost
on scal choices made by governments. To ll this gap, we introduce two
additional variables in the vector Yit of countriescharacteristics that might
inuence rms location choice, and thus the scal policy. The rst variable
is the unit labor cost in the manufacturing sector (ULCit). The second one is
the index of Golden et al. (2006) measuring the involvement of government
in the wage setting (REGit)34. As both variables are expected to increase
the labor costs, we expect them to deter investments and lead governments
to decrease their corporate tax rates.
The table 4 gives the results of this new regression. The data set for
this estimation is restricted to 14 countries because we had no data of labor
market characteristics for Greece, Ireland and Portugal. We report only re-
33 It is di¢ cult to evaluate the e¤ect of the labor cost on location choices made by rms
as the labor cost is positively correlated with labor productivity that we expect to have a
positive e¤ect on rms location choice.
34For details, see the appendix.
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Dependent variable STATTAX
Lagged EART
(ti;t 1)
EATR of countries j 6= i
(t i;t)
Top income tax rate
(TINCit)
Share of old people
(OLDit)
Share of young people
(Y OUit)
Share of urban people
(URBit)
Pub. cons. expenditures
(PCONSi;t 1)
Market size
(ABSit)
Market access
(MAit)
Unemployment rate
(UNEMPi;t 1)
GDP growth
(GDPGRit)
Government involvement in the wage setting
(REGi;t)
Unit labor cost
(ULCit)
Trend
(Tt)
0:615a
(0:118)
0:778a
(0:272)
 0:035
(0:054)
0:154
(0:689)
 0:183
(0:381)
0:738b
(0:352)
 0:012
(0:087)
0:007
(0:004)
0:008
(0:007)
 0:045
(0:101)
 0:006
(0:148)
0:001
(0:002)
0:605a
(0:113)
0:766a
(0:268)
 0:068
(0:063)
0:116
(0:736)
 0:143
(0:427)
0:734b
(0:328)
0:066
(0:095)
0:006
(0:004)
0:008
(0:007)
 0:089
(0:107)
 0:104
(0:129)
 0:006b
(0:003)
 0:024
(0:021)
0:001
(0:002)
Country xed e¤ects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
Hansen statistic (prob)
Serial correlation test (prob)
Endogeneity test of t i;t (prob)
Endogeneity test of TINCi;t (prob)
yes
224
0:801
0:732
0:174
0:013
0:014
yes
224
0:805
0:884
0:149
0:005
0:007
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Weigthing matrix based on the
bilateral trade phi-ness index WPHI . asignicant at 10%, b signicant at 5%,
csignicant at 1%.
Table 4: Estimation of tax interactions over the statutory tax rate
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sults of the tax reaction function over statutory tax rates with the weighting
matrix based on bilateral trade integration, as it is the only one that passes
both the serial correlation test and the test of overidentifying restrictions.
Firsltly, observe that tax interactions are still signicant after controlling
for the impact of labor market characteristics on corporate tax rates. Taking
into account these characteristics slightly improves the regression t and
leads to a decrease in the estimated coe¢ cient of tax interactions35. Thus,
it seems that not controlling for structural determinants of rmslocation
choice (market access, market size, or labor market characteristics) might
result in an overestimation of scal interactions. Observe also that the share
of people living in urban areas has a positive impact on statutory tax rates,
maybe because of agglomeration economies in cities or because most public
goods and services are concentrated in urban areas.
Now let us consider the labor market variables. The variable of unit
labor cost has the expected sign but is non signicant. This might result
from the correlation between this variable and labor productivity, which we
expect to have the opposite impact on corporate tax rates. Moreover, the
variable of government involvement in the wage setting has a signicant and
negative e¤ect on statutory tax rates. This result is interesting as it might
contribute to explain why corporate tax cuts are sometimes associated with
labor market policies aimed at increasing labor market regulation. For ex-
ample, in 1998, the United Kingdom has introduced a national minimum
wage for the rst time and, at the same time, decided signicant corporate
tax cuts. In May 2007, the US Congress approved the rst increase in the
federal minimum wage in nearly a decade. However, President Bush and
Senate Republicans have made business tax breaks a condition for support-
ing this minimum wage increase, and the two chambers nally accepted tax
breaks worth $4.8 billion over 10 years.
To summarize, it seems that labor market imperfections could lead gov-
ernments to lighten the scal burden on rms in order to compensate them
for the costs associated to these rigidities.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, we have estimated di¤erent reaction functions over the cor-
porate tax rate on a panel of 17 OECD countries between 1982 and 1999.
Our results support the tax competition hypothesis as we show that the
35Taking into account variables of market size and market access also improves the
adjusted R2.
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strongest tax interactions occur between countries that are important trade
partners. However, the level of corporate tax rate that can result from this
tax competition behavior di¤ers across countries. More precisely, the ability
of a country to set a high corporate tax rate increases with its market size
and its market access. This might explain why the highest corporate tax
rates are observed in G7 countries or in the EU-15. Moreover, the ability
of a country to set high corporate tax rates decreases with the degree of
governments involvement in the wage-setting. Finally, we show that trade
integration matters for the tax policy through two channels: (i) on the one
hand trade integration reinforces tax interactions and accelerates the race
to the bottom in corporate tax rates, but (ii) on the other hand trade inte-
gration makes it possible for countries to set higher corporate tax rates as
it improves their market access. We show that the second e¤ect becomes
insignicant when we control for the rst e¤ect. This indicates that the over-
all impact of trade integration on corporate tax rates is negative and could
explain the negative relationship between trade integration and corporate
tax rates that we observed in OECD countries between 1983 and 1999.
Thus, these results might contribute to explain the recent decline in cor-
porate tax rates and its close relationship with the trade integration process,
as well as the persistent scal disparities between OECD countries. How-
ever, as all empirical studies estimating a tax reaction function, we cannot
evaluate to which extent tax interactions comes from a tax competition be-
havior. Indeed, what looks like tax interactions could in fact partly result
from a common intellectual trend (Manski, 1993) or from changes in the do-
mestic determinants of corporate taxation (Slemrod, 2004). Moreover, the
index of capital mobility used in this empirical study, based on aggregated
FDI ows, is inaccurate. An index capturing the mobility of real capital
is needed to get more reliable results. Finally, we focused on the potential
e¤ect on the scal policy of structural determinants related to the market
access and labor costs. It would be interesting to go further by controlling
for the potential e¤ect of public infrastructures on scal policy, since a high
corporate tax rate might be partly compensated by the quality of public
infrastructures.
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A Appendix
A.1 Corporate tax rate by global region
A.2 Phiness of trade
In order to approximate the level of trade integration of a country, we
build on the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model with many countries and where
rms operate on market with monopolistic competition and barriers to trade
(Head and Mayer, 2004a). Under the hypotheses of no trade costs at the
subnational scale and symmetric trade costs at the international scale, we
get from this model the following bilateral index of trade phiness:
PHIij =
s
XijXji
XiiXjj
with Xij the total value of exportations (included trade costs) from country
i to country j, and Xii the total value of trade ows inside country i. This
index is symmetric because of the hypotheses on trade costs.
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We use the Trade and Production database of the CEPII that collects
trade ows at the ISIC rev2 3-digit industry level (26 industrial sectors)
to build a yearly bilateral and sectorial index of trade phiness PHIijst =p
XijstXjist=XiistXjjst, with s the sector in which trade ows occurs. Then,
we deduce a bilateral trade phiness index PHIijt by weighting this sectorial
index by the share of importations of country i in this sector:
PHIijt =
SX
s=1

PHIijst  Xjist
Xjit

(8)
with Xjist=Xjit = Xjist=
P
sXjist the proportion of the importations of
country i from country j in the sector s. To nish, we get the index of trade
integration associated a country i by weighting this bilateral index by the
share of importations of country i from country j, that is:
PHIit =
NX
j=1

PHIijt  Xjit
Xit

(9)
withXit total importations of country i at year t andXjit=Xit the proportion
of importations coming from the country j.
A.3 Market access
The original denition of the market potential by Harris (1954) is given by:
MPit =
P
j
Yjt
distij
(10)
with Yjt total expenditures coming from countries j and distij the distance
between country i and j.
We get the market access variable by summing total expenditures of
all countries except country i36. We take into account only high income
countries, according to the classication of the World Bank. Contrary to
Harris, we do not approximate trade integration by the inverse of distance
between countries. We approximate the level of trade integration by the
bilateral index of trade integration given by (8). Finally, we follow Head
and Mayer (2004a) by approximating total expenditures of countries by their
national apparent consumption. Thus, the market access variable (MAi;t)
is dened as:
36We can also call this variable non local market potential. It has been used by Mion
(2004), Hanson (2005), Mion and Naticchioni (2005), and Redding and Venables (2004)
in the estimation of wage equations, in order to limit an endogeneity bias.
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MAit =
X
j 6=i
Absjt  PHIijt (11)
A.4 Weigthing matrices
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A.5 Results of tax interactions over the statutory tax rate
and over the e¤ective marginal tax rate
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A.6 Data sources and summary statistics
Denitions and data sources
EATRit : e¤ective average tax rate (source: Devereux et al. (2002)).
EMTRit : e¤ective marginal tax rate (source: Devereux et al. (2002)).
STATTAXit : statutory tax rate (source: Devereux et al. (2002)).
TINCit : top marginal income tax rate (source: World Tax Database).
ULCit : unit labor cost in manufacturing sector (source: OECD)
PHIit : trade phi-ness index (our calculations, sources: Trade and Pro-
duction database and the Distances database of the CEPII).
IDEit : sum of inward and outward FDI ows over GDP (our calcula-
tions, source: CNUCED and OECD Social Expenditures database).
PCONSit : public consumption in percentage of GDP per capita (source:
Penn World Table 6.1.).
ABSit : national apparent consumption 10 9 (our calculations, source:
OECD Social Expenditures database et CEPII trade and production data-
base).
MAit : non local market potential 10 9 (our calculations, sources:
Trade and Production database of the CEPII).
UNEMPit : standardized unemployment rate (source: OECD Social
Expenditures database).
URBi;t : proportion of population living in urban areas (source: World
Bank Development Indicators).
OLDi;t : proportion of population more than 65 years old (source: World
Bank Development Indicators).
Y OUi;t : proportion of population less than 14 years old (source: World
Bank Development Indicators).
GDPGRi;t : GDP growth rate from year t 1 to year t (our calculations,
source: OECD Social Expenditures database).
Tt : linear time trend.
REGit : index of government involvement in the wage-setting (source:
Golden, Miriam; Peter Lange; and Michael Wallerstein. 2006. Union
Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Study.
Dataset available at http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/. Version dated
June 16, 2006).
The coding of the index of government involvement in wage-setting is
described as follows:
1. Government uninvolved in wage setting.
2. Government establishes minimum wage(s).
3. Government extends collective agreements.
45
4. Government provides economic forecasts to bargaining partners.
5. Government recommends wage guidelines or norms.
6. Government and unions negotiate wage guidelines.
7. Government imposes wage controls in selected industries.
8. Government imposes cost of living adjustment.
9. Formal tripartite agreement for national wage schedule without sanc-
tions.
10. Formal tripartite agreement for national wage schedule with sanc-
tions.
11. Government arbitrator imposes wage schedules without sanctions on
unions.
12. Government arbitrator imposes national wage schedule with sanc-
tions.
13. Government imposes national wage schedule with sanctions.
14. Formal tripartite agreement for national wage schedule with supple-
mentary
local bargaining prohibited.
15. Government imposes wage freeze and prohibits supplementary local
bargaining.
Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
STATTAXit 0:410 0:122 0:100 0:627
EATRit 0:305 0:090 0:050 0:481
EMTRit 0:256 0:100 0:000 0:478
FDIit 0:032 0:040  0:003 0:330
PHIit 0:053 0:035 0:007 0:222
OPENit 0:541 0:277 0:134 1:636
OLDit 0:139 0:021 0:098 0:180
URBit 0:705 0:105 0:443 0:893
Y OUit 0:196 0:029 0:144 0:303
PCONSit 0:112 0:057 0:031 0:269
MAit 0:521 0:469 0:065 3:367
ABSit 0:959 1:608 0:024 9:351
REGit 5:239 3:007 1 15
ULCit 0:635 0:207 0:2 1:2
Table 7: Summary statistics
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